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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the relationship between political instability, measured by a
country’s Polity2 decmocratization score, and economic performance, measured by
the GDP per capita. We use data from 1985 to 2002 for 25 countries in five different
regions: Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and
Southeast Asia. The results of the empirical models in this paper show a significant
relationship between democracy and economic growth, but no significant sign of
endogeneity (joint causality) as suggested by previous research. This paper also finds
the ‘optimal’ Polity2 score that maximizes GDP per capita in each of the five regions.

Special thanks to Professor Gary Krueger, Aaron Albertson, Jean Beccone and Beth Hillemann.

1. Introduction
What is the nature of the relationship between political instability and
economic growth in a country? This question has been the subject of a long-standing
debate among many economists and political scientists.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between instability and growth. We
consider different issues on which social scientists disagree, such as the direction of
causality and the measurement of political instability. On the direction of causality,
we consider the hypothesis that political instability causes slower economic growth
and the hypothesis that both political instability and economic growth are
endogenous. We look at data from countries across five different regions to study the
correlation between instability and growth and to determine any region-specific
factors that affect this relationship. As for the measurement of political instability,
this paper provides a description of an ideal data set that, in a perfect world, would be
used to study the relationship. Given limitations on data, however, this paper uses a
measure that only considers one aspect of political instability: democratization.
This paper adds to some of the previous literature by considering the idea of
an optimal level of political instability in different regions.

We construct five

polynomials, one for each of the regions being studied, and find the level of political
instability ‘needed’ in order to maximize economic performance.
This paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 reviews the theoretical
framework and previous literature on the relationship between political instability and
economic performance. Section 3 discusses the conceptual models underlying this
relationship. Section 4 gives a description of data that would be used in an ideal
world to study this subject. Section 5 describes the data and measurements used in
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this study. In section 6, we present the empirical models and the results, and, finally,
section 7 concludes this study and provides recommendations for further research.

2. Literature Review
2.1

Theoretical Background
The basic theory underlying the relationship between political systems and

economic growth was discussed in a paper by McGuire and Olson (1996). The
analysis in that paper centered around three forms of political organization: anarchy,
dictatorship and democracy. In anarchy, “roving bandits” rule the land and have no
interest in the public good. They use their armies to maximize their own income, and
citizens have no incentive to produce. Hence, total income in anarchy is very low.
In the Mcguire/Olson model, “stationary bandits” settle down and create an
autocracy with a monopoly of theft.

Since these rulers have a stake in the

productivity of their people, they tend to tax moderately and provide some public
goods. This leaves the people with an incentive to have a higher level of production.
Autocrats, however still seek to maximize their personal wealth and extract a
significant amount of rent from the citizenry.
The authors argue democracies will tend to provide a higher level of public
goods and engage in less rent extraction than in autocracy. The reason for this is that,
even under simple majority rule, citizens’ “encompassing interest” will naturally limit
rent seeking when it reduces total income by more than the rent extracted from the
minority. McGuire and Olson show that with perfect targeting---in which the rent
extracting program goes entirely to the majority—a 51 percent majority will stop rent
seeking when it decreases total income by 2 units for every unit of rent. Under
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imperfect targeting, in which some fraction of the minority receives the benefit, rent
seeking behavior will be even lower.

This is equally beneficial to the entire

population, which includes all minorities. And since public goods are needed to
produce output, the “super-encompassing” nature of democracies leads to higher
economic growth.
The key to the McGuire/Olson model is, however, the credibility of the
“monopoly of theft” on the part of the government. If the autocrat is in an uncertain
position, or if the citizens believe the government’s position is uncertain, the incentive
to invest in public goods and increase income is reduced. Hence political instability
which undermines the government’s long-run credibility should have detrimental
effects on economic performance.
Olson (1991) also gives a theoretical background on the relationship between
instability and economic growth.

The paper further discusses the “super-

encompassing” nature of democracies, citing examples such as the incentives of
democratic leaders to lead a stable economy in order to run for reelection. Olson also
argues that political instability is the cause for slower economic growth, and not vice
versa, although the “demand for democracy” may rise with increased income.
Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1992) and De Haan and Siermann (1996)
provide two, more explicit theoretical arguments for why political instability slows
down economic growth. The first paper uses the concept of uncertainty. A high
propensity of government change (which may be considered as a measure of political
instability) often leads to uncertainty about the policies of the new government. As a
result, investors would exit the economy, and potential investors would seek a more
stable environment. The second paper says that instability reduces the supply of both
capital and labor. This, in turn, discourages investment due to the increased risk of
capital loss. Also, political turmoil causes capital flight and brain drain and hampers
3

the establishment of property rights, which are necessary in order to realize
productivity gains.

2.2

Previous Empirical Research
While social scientists have long recognized the relationship between political

instability and economic performance, our empirical understanding of this
relationship is limited. The literature is divided in many dimensions. There is little
consensus on the direction of causality, the definition and measurement of political
instability and the type of data capable of yielding an accurate test of the various
theories.
A central question in this research is the direction of causality: does a more
stable political environment lead to economic prosperity, or does economic prosperity
set the stage for political stability? The empirical research is divided into three
schools of thought.

The first argues that political instability causes slower (or,

sometimes, faster) economic growth (Campos and Nugent (2000)).

The second

school of thought argues that economic performance drives political stability
(Zablotsky (1996)), while a third group claims that causality runs both ways
(Kirmanoglu (2003)).
In addition to approaching the issue of causality from a variety of
perspectives, the empirical research is also divided on the issue of how one actually
defines and measures political instability.

The research papers also vary in the

regions (samples) they examine. Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1992) looked
at a panel of 113 countries, while Campos, Nugent and Robinson (1999) looked at
countries in the Middle East and North Africa). One advantage of a region-specific
focus is that it allows for using measures of political instability suitable for the region.
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This paper, adopts a global approach while also adding region-specific dummy
variables to capture major regional variation.
Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1992) and de Haan and Siermann (1996)
assert that political instability causes slower economic development. Both papers
used GDP as the dependent economic variable and changes in government as the
measure for political instability.

The papers differ, however, in the way they

quantified changes in government. Alesina et al assigned a numerical value for each
country by averaging the probabilities of a change in government for that country
over several years. They concluded that in countries and time periods with high
propensity of government change, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. De
Haan et al, on the other hand, used a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the
number of government transfers exceeds seven and 1 otherwise. Using such a binary
variable to measure variations in political instability within a large panel of countries
is insufficient and is probably why the authors found no statistically significant
relationship between instability and growth (except in Africa).
While also using GDP as the dependent economic variable, Campos and
Nugent (2000) and Goldsmith (1987) each constructed their own measures for
political instability.

Instead of using changes in government, Campos et al

constructed two indices to measure political instability, one for mild and another for
severe instability.

Goldsmith used a similar methodology but also incorporated

changes in stability between two time periods. He classified his sample into four
groups of countries: Consistently Stable (countries that were stable in both time
periods), Chronically Unstable (countries that were unstable in both time periods),
Stabilizing (countries that became more stable in the later time period, compared to
the earlier one), and Destabilizing (countries that became less stable in the later time
period, compared to the earlier one). Both Campos et al and Goldsmith found no
5

statistically significant relationship between political instability and economic growth.
However, like de Haan et al, Campos et al found a significant negative relationship in
African countries.
The paper by Aisen and Veiga (2003) is also notable. This paper differed
from most of the previous literature in its use of inflation, rather than GDP, as the
measure for economic performance.

Besides studying the relationship between

instability and inflation, the authors also considered how instability affects inflation
volatility. Aisen et al found a negative relationship between instability and inflation,
especially in countries with high inflation (compared to those with ‘moderate’ or
‘low’ inflation, according to their classification). The authors used the logarithm of
inflation as the dependent variable for studying the relationship between instability
and inflation, while they used the logarithm of the standard deviation of inflation to
study volatility.
The papers discussed so far have all tested the hypothesis that political
instability causes slow economic growth, and not vice versa.

Zablotsky (1996)

studied the relationship from a different perspective. He proposed that slow economic
growth causes political instability. The author measured growth using the percentage
of agricultural products in a country’s GDP and political instability using the
probability of a military coup d’etat. Zablotsky found this probability by using an
optimization problem, in which he looked at factors that would cause military leaders
to participate in a coup. The results of the paper were consistent with its stated
hypothesis.
Before looking into the literature on joint causality, we should mention a paper
written by Kirmanoglu (2003) in which the author used Granger tests to study the
direction of causality in the relationship between stability and growth. The author
included 19 countries in his study and used per capita GDP and an index of political
6

freedom as variables. After transforming the series into a stationary series in order to
be able to conduct the Granger tests, Kirmanoglu found no empirical relationship
between instability and economic growth in 14 of the 19 countries. In two countries,
he found that political stability seemed to generate economic growth, while, in the
three remaining countries, he found that the causality was in the opposite direction.
The third school of thought mentioned earlier in this section argues that
causality in the relationship between political instability and economic growth runs in
both directions. Besides their single equation model discussed above, Alesina et al
also included a model with simultaneous equations to address the issue of
endogeneity. For their political instability equation, the authors used changes in
government as the dependent variable and several independent variables such as GDP
per capita, cabinet changes and a dummy variable for whether a country is a
democracy or not.

In the economic growth equation, average per capita growth in

GDP was the dependent variable, while independent variables included proxies for the
levels of income and human capital, region-specific dummy variables, as well as other
control variables.

The instrumental variables used were the enrollment rate in

primary schools, the lagged number of occurrences of an “executive adjustment” and
the lagged number of occurrences of a coup d’etat. Alesina et al concluded that
economic growth and political instability are correlated and jointly endogenous,
which means that neither of them can be taken as predetermined.
Finally, we briefly discuss two other papers which studied the effects of
political instability on economic growth in specific regions. Campos, Nugent and
Robinson (1999) looked at the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), while Brada,
Kutan and Yigit (2004) considered countries in Central Europe and the Balkans.
Campos et al hypothesized that domestic instability can have positive effects
on investment in the MENA region (because governments would be induced to
7

improve policy), while external instability would have a negative impact on
investment.
As mentioned earlier, studying countries in one region allows for the use of
region-specific independent variables. Campos et al used such variables, one of
which was a variable describing a country’s proximity to Israel. Using data from
1970 to 1990, the authors ended up with empirical evidence that supported their
hypothesis.
Brada et al studied the effects of transition and political instability on foreign
direct investment (FDI) inflows in Central Europe and the Balkans. The authors
found that the economic costs of political instability in this region have been quite
high, especially in the Balkans. An interesting aspect in the authors’ methodology
here is their use of other European economies (those that are not undergoing transition
and that are not subject to serious political instability). To avoid bias resulting from
different sample periods for different transition countries (because of the lack of data),
the authors established a relationship between FDI inflows and country characteristics
for non-transition European countries. This gave sufficient observations to develop
robust, unbiased estimates for transition countries. One of the weaknesses of this
paper, on the other hand, is that it did not include a clear measure of political
instability but rather several proxies that represent a country’s economic
characteristics and transition strategies, which, according to the authors, are a
reflection of policy changes and stability.
To conclude this section, previous literature has used various models and
methodologies to study the relationship between political instability and economic
performance. There were clearly differences in the hypothesized direction of
causality and the measures of political instability. Most of the literature, however,
seemed to argue that political instability causes slower economic growth (although a
8

TABLE 1
Comparison of regressions predicting economic growth using political instability
Control
Coefficient
Paper
Year
Dependent
Measure(s) of
Variables
estimate for
Published
Variable
political
instability
instability
1

1. Cross-Sectional Regressions
de Haan

1996

GDP growth

Govt. changes

-0.51
(0.5)

Population and
capital growth
rates

Alesina

1992

Per cap. GDP
growth

Govt. changes (1)

-0.005
(-1.84)

EDUC2,
GROWTH(-1)

Campos

2000

ΔGDP

SPI

-0.128
(-0.580)

Institutions and
4
initial income

Aisen

2003

Log(Inf)

Polity2 (among
others)

5

0.025
(2.71)

GDP_gr,
6
Real_Over ,
7
Oil_ch

Log(SDInf)

Cabchg(-1)
(among others)

0.210
(1.61)

GDP(ppp,
SD(GDP_gr)(1), Oil_ch,
Agric_va,
8
Trade

GDP

Assassinations,
executive
transfers, armed
attacks, deaths
from violence

N/A

N/A

-8.607

Oil prices,

(-2.09)

growth(-1),

Goldsmith

1987

3

2. Region-Specific Regressions
Campos

1999

FDISTORT

9

WAR

10

(among

others)

HFDISTORT
Brada

2004

11

Log(FDI )

12

N/A

N/A

N/A

1

Although these regressions are cross-sectional, many of them contained region-specific dummy variables.
EDUC: the enrollment ratio in primary school.
1
SPI was measured using indices for mild and severe instability.
1
The authors ran other regression with different control variables. The results shown were obtained when institutions and initial
income were controlled.
1
Polity2: overall measure of political stability.
1
Real_Over is the real effective overvaluation of the national currency.
1
Oil_ch: percentage annual change in oil prices.
1
Agric_va and Trade represent the percentage of GDP of the value added from agriculture and from trade, respectively.
1
FDISTORT: freedom from distortion index.
1
WAR takes the value 0 if a country did not participate in a war during a given year, 1 if it participated in a war, and 2 if it
participated in a major war.
1
FDI: foreign direct investments.
1
Brada et al used several proxies to measure both a country’s economic characteristics and its transition strategies (which
includes the effect of stability)
1
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number of papers yielded no statistically significant results). Like Alesina et al, this
paper will include both a single-equation model and a simultaneous equation model to
study the relationship between stability and growth.
Table 1 includes a summary of previous empirical research discussed in this
section.

3. Conceptual Models
In this paper, we include two models: a single equation model to study the
hypothesis that political instability causes slower economic growth, and as
simultaneous equations model to study the hypothesis that political instability and
economic growth are jointly correlated and endogenous.

3.1

Single Equation Model
In this single equation model, economic growth is a function of political

instability, as well as the growth in human capital, physical capital and technology.
Economic growthit = f(Human capitalit, Physical capitalit, Technologyit, Political Instabilityit)

The first three arguments in the model above can be explained with basic
economic theory. Having more human capital, physical capital and technology in an
economy leads to higher levels of growth. As for political instability, the theoretical
framework of this study suggests that more political instability leads to lower
economic growth.

3.2

Simultaneous Equations Model
The simultaneous equations model considers the issue of endogeneity. It

examines the hypothesis that neither political instability nor economic growth can be
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taken as predetermined, which means that they are both endogenous and jointly
correlated.
Economic growthit = f(Human capitalit, Physical capitalit, Technologyit, Political Instabilityit)
Political Instabilityit = f(Economic growthit, Non-economic factorsit)

The economic growth equation is similar to the one in the single equation
model. The political instability equation, on the other hand, states that instability is a
function of economic growth, as well as other non-economic factors (i.e. variables
that affect political instability but do not affect economic growth).

4. Ideal Data
Ideally, we would like to measure political instability with variables that
capture its different forms. These include (1) executive changes (such as changes in
government, changes in policies, coups, etc) and (2) military instabilities (such as
armed conflicts, civilian deaths from conflicts, etc). Having such measures would
allow us to distinguish between the effects of different forms of political instability on
economic growth.
A suitable measure for economic growth would be comprehensive (such as
GDP or GDP per capita). Such a measure would give a clear picture of an economy’s
overall performance in a particular period of time.
Ideal measures for the non-economic factors affecting political instability
(specified in the political instability equation of the simultaneous equations model)
would capture all such factors, which might include the number of political parties,
participation in elections, diplomatic relations with foreign countries, civil liberties,
etc. Such factors affect political instability, yet they do not significantly influence
economic performance.
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As for the control variables, ideal measures for human capital would capture
the changes in the population and the quality of the effective labor force, while an
ideal measure for physical capital would give an exact value for all the physical
capital in an economy in a particular period. Finally, an ideal measure for technology
would give a quantitative value of how much new technology is being incorporated in
an economy at a particular period of time. Such a variable would measure things like
the number and quality of new machines in different industries.

5. Actual Data
Our panel data set includes observations from 25 countries between the years
1985 and 2002. The countries are distributed evenly among five regions: Africa,
Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. (See
the data set in the Appendix for a full list of countries.)
There is very limited, freely-available data on political instability.1 Also,
much of the available data measures democratization, as opposed to stability per se.
However, given the theory underlying the relationship between instability and growth
(discussed in section 2.1), such measures of democratization would be good proxies
for political instability. In this paper, we use the Polity2 score as a measure for
political instability. Polity2 was published in the Polity IV dataset project by Monty
G. Marshall of the University of Maryland, College Park and Keith Jaggers of
Colorado State University in 2002. The score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to
+10 (strongly democratic).

1

The Cross-National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS) includes many of the measures mentioned in
the ‘Ideal Data’ section. However, data in the CNTS is not available for free at Macalester College.
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For the non-economic factors affecting political instability, we use the total
freedom score published by Freedom House, a non-profit organization based in
Washington, DC. The freedom score is the sum of two separate scores, one for
political rights and the other for civil liberties. The total score ranges from 1 (low
freedom) to 14 (high freedom). Although this score is probably somewhat correlated
with economic growth, we believe it is a good proxy for non-economic factors that
affect a country’s democratization status in a given period of time.
No data was available on school enrollment—the preferred measurement for
human capital—for some of the countries being studied. Annual population growth
was, therefore, used instead. Energy use (measured in kilograms of oil per capita)
was the measure we used for physical capital, while the number of television sets per
one thousand people was used to measure technology. Data on GDP per capita,
population growth, energy use and the number of TV sets were all obtained from the
website of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

6. Empirical Models and Results
6.1

Single Equation Model
Given the conceptual model in section 3 and the actual data listed in section 5,

we have the following single equation regression:
Regression 1:
GDP_PER_CAPit = β0+β1POP_GRWOTHit+β2ENG_USEit+β3TV_PER_1Kit+β4POLITY2it

where POP_GROWTHit is the percentage of population growth in country i at year t
ENG_USEit is the energy use (in kilograms of oil equivalent per capita) in
country i at year t
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TV_PER_1Kit is the number of television sets per 1,000 people in country i at
year t
POLITY2it is the Polity2 score for country i at year t
According to the theoretical framework discussed in section 2.1, we
hypothesize a positive sign for β4.

An increase in democracy (i.e. decrease in

instability) limits rent extracting and, thus, increases GDP per capita. Also, according
to economic theory, we hypothesize positive signs for β1, β2 and β3.
The results in Table 3 (on page 19) seem to be in accord with our expectations.
A one point increase in the Polity2 score for a country in a particular time period
increases GDP per capita by about $154. Also, the values of all the coefficients (β’s)
are all statistically significant.
We also calculated the elasticity of the Polity2 score. Every 1% increase in
that score would result in a 5% increase in GDP per capita.

This shows that

democracy clearly has a significant effect on economic growth.
Furthermore, to test for regional variations in the relationship between
political instability and economic performance, we constructed four, region-specific
dummy variables and produced the following two regressions:
Regression 2:
GDP_PER_CAPit = β0 + β5AFRICAi + β6CEEURi + β7LATAMi + β8SEASIAi +
β1POP_GRWOTHit + β2ENG_USEit + β3TV_PER_1Kit +
β4POLITY2it

where AFRICAi takes the value ‘1’ if country i is in Africa and ‘0’ otherwise
CEEURi takes the value ‘1’ if country i is in Central/Eastern Europe and ‘0’
otherwise
LATAMi takes the value ‘1’ if country i is in Latin America and ‘0’ otherwise
SEASIAi takes the value ‘1’ if a country i is in Southeast Asia and ‘0’
otherwise
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(Here, β0 is the intercept for the omitted ‘Middle East’ group, and β5, β6, β7 and β8 are
the differences between the intercepts of the respective groups and the intercept of the
Middle East group.)
Regression 3:
GDP_PER_CAPit = β0 + β5AFRICAi + β6CEEURi + β7LATAMi + β8SEASIAi +
β1POP_GRWOTHit + β2ENG_USEit + β3TV_PER_1Kit +
β4POLITY2it + β9POLITY2AFRICAit + β10POLITY2CEEURit +
β11POLITY2LATAMit + β12POLITY2SEASIAit

where POLITY2AFRICAit is POLITY2it multiplied by AFRICAi
POLITY2CEEURit is POLITY2it multiplied by CEEURi
POLITY2LATAMit is POLITY2it multiplied by LATAMi
POLITY2SEASIAit is POLITY2it multiplied by SEASIAi
(Again, β4 is the Polity2 slope for the omitted ‘Middle East’ group, and β9, β10, β11
and β12 are the differences between the Polity2 slopes for the respective groups and
the Polity2 slope for the Middle East group.)
Regression 2 only measures the differences in average GDP per capita among
the different regions. The results seem to show that, compared to countries in the
Middle East, countries in Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia seem
to have a lower average GDP per capita, while countries in Latin America seem to
have a slightly larger average GDP per capita. (We should note, however, that some
of the values obtained are statistically insignificant.)
Regression 3, on the other hand, measures how economic performance
responds to political instability in different regions. The coefficients obtained show
that more democracy increases GDP per capita in all five regions. This increase,
however, is, by far, the highest for countries in the Middle East ($396 compared to
$36 for Africa, $60 for Central/Eastern Europe, $18 for Latin America and $54 for
Southeast Asia for every one point increase in the Polity2 score). Note that in both
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regressions 2 and 3, the coefficients for the control variables (population growth,
energy use and the number of television sets) all remained statistically significant in
the hypothesized positive direction.

An Optimal Level of Political Instability
Most of the theoretical background discussed in section 2.1 suggests that less
political instability (measured by a high democracy score) leads to more economic
growth. But can a very high democracy score be detrimental to the economy?2
To examine this question and to see whether there is an ‘optimal’ Polity2
score corresponding to the highest GDP per capita, we produced the following
regression:
Regression 4:
GDP_PER_CAP = β0 + β5AFRICAi + β6CEEURi + β7LATAMi + β8SEASIAi +
β1POP_GRWOTHit + β2ENG_USEit + β3TV_PER_1Kit +
β4POLITY2it + β9POLITY2AFRICAit + β10POLITYCEEURit +
β11POLITY2LATAMit + β12POLITY2SEASIAit + β13POLITY22it
+ β14POLITY22AFRICAit + β15POLITY22CEEURit +
β16POLITY22LATAMit + β17POLITY22SEASIAit

where POLITY22it is the signed square of POLITY2it
POLITY22AFRICAit is POLITY22it multiplied by AFRICAi
POLITY22CEEURit is POLITY22it multiplied by CEEURi
POLITY22LATAMit is POLITY22it multiplied by LATAMi
POLITY22SEASIAit is POLITY22it multiplied by SEASIAi
By adding the signed square of the Polity2 score and the interaction variables
to the regression above, we can capture the relationship between political instability
(measured by Polity2) and economic growth (measured by GDP per capita) in the
2

In his book The Rise and Fall of Nations, Mancur Olson, as referenced by Goldsmith (1987),
examined this question. According to Olson, a higher level of democracy and political freedom leads
to the emergence of interest groups he called “distributional coalitions” whose self-seeking activities
can be harmful to economic efficiency and growth.
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form of five polynomials, one for each region. From the results of regression 4, we
obtain the following (Note: The control variables are held constant):
For Africa:
GDP_PER_CAPit = 26.222 + (256.6178*POLITY2it) + ( -28.1896*POLITY22it)
For Central/Eastern Europe:
GDP_PER_CAPit = -1347.96 + (185.7444*POLITY2it) + ( -14.8339*POLITY22it)
For Latin America:
GDP_PER_CAPit = 1641.928 + (699.7906*POLITY2it) + (-88.1206*POlITY22it)
For Southeast Asia:
GDP_PER_CAPit = 192.1722 + (-74.348*POLITY2it) + (16.70009*POLITY22it)
For the Middle East:
GDP_PER_CAPit = 1064.174 + (287.1965*POLITY2it) + (12.58083*POLITY22it)
Following are the graphs for the polynomials above within the range of all
possible Polity2 scores (-10 to +10):
FIGURE 1: GDP per capita vs. Polity2 in Africa

FIGURE 3: GDP per capita vs. Polity2 in
Latin America

FIGURE 2: GDP per capita vs. Polity2 in
Central/Eastern Europe

FIGURE 4: GDP per capita vs. Polity2 in
Southeast Asia
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FIGURE 5: GDP per capita vs. Polity2 in the
Middle East

From the graphs above, we see that in all regions, except the Middle East,
there seems to be an optimal level for the Polity2 score that is below 10. In other
words, the Middle East is the only region where increased democracy always leads to
higher GDP per capita.
Following are the optimal Polity2 scores for each region. These values were
found by using the first derivatives of the polynomials above and by looking at the
endpoints (-10 and 10). We can see that there are very few cases (from our data set)
in which a country was at its region’s optimal Polity2 score:
TABLE 2
Optimal Polity2 scores for different regions

Region
Africa
Central/Eastern
Europe
Latin America
Southeast Asia
Middle East

Examples from Data

Optimal Polity2 Score
(rounded to the nearest
integer)
5
6

South Africa in 1990, 1991
None

4
-10
10

None
None
Israel in 1999-2002

Note that for some regions, the optimal Polity2 score yields a negative GDP
per capita. This is probably due to the negative intercepts of some of the polynomials.
Finally, we should note that when examining the residuals from the four
regressions above (all residual graphs can be found in the Appendix), we noticed that
the highest residuals corresponded to observations from Israel. Israel is considered a
highly democratic state, yet political unrest in the Middle East in the past few years
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TABLE 3

Summary of results for the single equation regressions#
For all regressions:
Dependent variable: GDP per capita (constant 2000 international $)
Coefficient (t-statistic in parentheses)
Variable
Regression 1
Regression 2
Regression 3
Intercepto
-1027.087*
108.439
1240.869*
(-3.366)
(0.252)
(3.228)
Dummy variable for Africa
-366.259
-1222.048*
(-1.243)
(-4.573)
Dummy variable for
-2364.304*
-2505.904*
Central/Eastern Europe
(-6.723)
(-8.021)
Dummy variable for Latin
84.720
261.320
America
(0.257)
(0.547)
Dummy variable for
-514.600
-1017.338*
Southeast Asia
(-1.665)
(-3.633)
Population growth (%,
778.295*
374.372*
339.930*
annual)
(9.059)
(3.872)
(4.090)
Energy use (kg of oil
2.928*
3.054*
2.776*
equivalent per capita)
(20.872)
(20.627)
(18.467)
Television sets (per 1,000
8.276*
8.810*
8.351*
people)
(6.891)
(6.790)
(7.070)
Polity2 scoreo
153.855*
135.841*
395.680*
(9.337)
(7.714)
(14.753)
Polity2 score interacted with
-359.722*
‘Africa’ dummy
(-9.332)
-336.342*
Polity2 score interacted with
(-8.600)
‘Central/Eastern Europe’
dummy
Polity2 score interacted with
-378.486*
‘Latin America’ dummy
(-6.624)
Polity2 score interacted with
-342.203*
‘Southeast Asia’ dummy
(-8.710)
Signed square of Polity2
o
score
Signed square of Polity2
score interacted with ‘Africa’
dummy
Signed square of Polity2
score interacted with
‘Central/Eastern Europe’
dummy
Signed square of Polity2
score interacted with ‘Latin
America’ dummy
Signed square of Polity2
score interacted with
‘Southeast Asia’ dummy
Adjusted R2
0.759
0.796
0.850
Sample size**
396
396
396
Sum of squared residuals
1.27x109
1.06x109
7.70x108

Regression 4
1064.174*
(2.457)
-1037.952*
(-3.607)
-2412.131*
(-7.397)
577.754
(1.175)
-872.002*
(-2.818)
358.265*
(4.195)
2.812*
(16.960)
8.259*
(6.643)
287.197*
(2.224)
-30.578
(-0.165)
-101.452
(-0.513)
412.594
(1.764)
-361.545
(-1.940)
12.581
(0.851)
-40.770
(-1.835)
-27.415
(-1.231)
-100.701*
(-3.535)
4.119
(0.180)
0.855
396
7.33x108

# First-order serial correlation was found in some countries for different regressions.
o
In regressions which include dummy variables, the omitted group is the ‘Middle East’ group.
* For intercepts and interaction terms: Statistically different from zero at the 5% level. / For slopes (excluding interaction terms):
Statistically different from zero in the hypothesized direction at the 5% level.
** The sample size was originally 450 (25 countries x 18 years), but some data were unavailable for particular countries and
years.
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has hindered economic growth in Israel. In terms of our measurements, Israel has a
high Polity2 score but a low GDP per capita. The case of Israel is an example of why
other forms of political instability (besides the degree to which a country is an
autocracy or a democracy) should be considered when studying the relationship
between instability and growth.

6.2

Simultaneous Equations Model
Following are the simultaneous equations that we used to examine the

hypothesis of endogeneity (joint causality) between political instability and economic
growth:
Regression 5:
GDP_PER_CAPit= α1 + α2POP_GROWTHit + α3ENG_USEit +
α4TV_PER_1Kit + α5POLITY2it
POLITY2 = α6 + α7GDP_PER_CAPit + α8FREEDOMit

where FREEDOMit is a country’s freedom score in a particular year.
By running the above regression using ordinary least squares and two-stage
least squares (with POP_GROWTH, ENG_USE, TV_PER_1K and FREEDOM as the
instrumental variables) and comparing the resulting standard errors using the
Hausman Test3 (shown in the Appendix), we conclude that there is no joint causality
between political instability and economic growth. We should note, however, that it
is hard to obtain data on a variable that affects political instability but that is not
correlated with economic growth. Although we used the freedom score as one of the
instrumental variables, there is some degree of correlation between that score and
economic growth.
The results of regression 5 are shown in Table 4 below:

3

Special thanks to Professor Gary Krueger for personally conducting the Hausman Test on my results.
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TABLE 4
Summary of results for the simultaneous equations regressions
Coefficient (t-statistic in parentheses)
Variable
Ordinary Least Squares
Two-Stage Least Squares
Method
Method
Economic growth equation
Dependent variable: GDP per capita (constant 2000 international $)
Intercept
-1027.087*
-943.565*
(-3.366)
(-3.05)
Population growth (%, annual)
778.295*
803.397*
(9.059)
(9.212)
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per
2.928*
2.948*
capita)
(20.872)
(20.737)
Television sets (per 1,000 people)
8.276*
6.689*
(6.891)
(5.247)
Polity2 score
153.855*
205.904*
(9.337)
(9.865)
Adjusted R2
0.759
0.753
Sample size
396
396
Sum of squared residuals
1.27x109
1.30x109
Political instability equation
Dependent variable: Polity2 score
Intercept
-9.336*
-9.123*
(-27.373)
(-22.819)
GDP per capita (constant 2000
0.000122*
0.000082
international $)
(2.547)
(1.217)
Freedom score
1.603*
1.610*
(30.717)
(25.506)
Adjusted R2
0.767
0.739
Sample size
444
396
Sum of squared residuals
4621.923
4488.549
Result of Hausman Test: Do not reject null hypothesis of no joint correlation at 5% level**
* For intercepts: Statistically different from zero at the 5% level. / For slopes: Statistically different from zero in the hypothesized
direction at the 5% level.
** At a 25% level of significance, the Hausman Test yields a result that supports joint causality. However, we will only consider
the result at the 5% level.

The table above also shows that there is no strong effect for GDP per capita on
the Polity2 score. According to the two-stage least squares coefficient for GDP per
capita in the political instability equation, it takes an increase of $10,000 in GDP per
capita to cause only a one-point (0.82) increase in the Polity2 score. The freedom
score, on the other hand, has a significant effect on the Polity2 score, which is not
surprising. An increase in the freedom score by one point increases the Polity2 score
by about two points (1.6). (Note, however, that the freedom score is a fourteen-point
score, while the Polity2 score is a twenty-one-point score.)

21

7. Conclusion and Further Research
Using data from 1985 to 2002 from 25 countries in five different regions, we
have found significant evidence supporting the hypothesis that political instability,
measured by the lack of democracy, causes slower economic growth. We could not
conclude, however, that political instability and economic growth are endogenous and
jointly determined.
This paper also examined how economies in different regions respond to
political instability. We generated second-order polynomials relating GDP per capita
to the Polity2 score and found the score that would generate the highest GDP per
capita in each region. Results varied greatly among different regions. Southeast Asia
had the highest GDP per capita at the lowest Polity2 score, while the Middle East had
the highest GDP per capita at the highest Polity2 score.
Nonetheless, this paper did not investigate the relationship between economic
growth and other forms of instability (besides democratization). Political instability is
a multidimensional concept that is not very accurately captured with one variable.
However, due to the lack of data as well as the theoretical support for measuring
instability with the degree of democratization, we used the Polity2 score in our
research.
Finally, we believe future research on this subject should take into account
region-specific measures of political instability. Government changes may not be
considered as signs of instability in some regions, and coup d’etats are virtually
inexistent in others. Furthermore, we also propose considering the effects of political
instability in neighboring countries on economic growth. Many economies suffer
greatly due to nearby conflicts and not any domestic instability.
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Finally, the relationship between economic performance and political
instability is very complex. In this paper, we have shown that at least some degree of
political instability (measured by the lack of democratization) can be detrimental to
growth in the economy.
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Appendix
E-Views Regression Outputs and Residual Graphs
Regression 1:
GDP_PER_CAPit = β0+β1POP_GRWOTHit+β2ENG_USEit+β3TV_PER_1Kit+β4POLITY2it
LS // Dependent Variable is GDP_PER_CAP
Date: 05/04/05 Time: 13:22
Sample: 1 450
Included observations: 396
Excluded observations: 54
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Statistic

C
POP_GROWTH
ENG_USE
TV_PER_1K
POLITY2

-1027.087
778.2946
2.928322
8.275814
153.855

305.1321
85.91299
0.140301
1.200964
16.47887

-3.366039
9.059102
20.87169
6.890975
9.3365

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

0.761133
0.758689
1798.748
1.27E+09
-3527.343
0.176476

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwartz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Prob.
0.0008
0
0
0
0
5835.141
3661.693
15.00224
15.05251
311.4733
0

25000
20000
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000

0

0
-5000
-10000
50

100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Residual

Actual

Fitted
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Regression 2:
GDP_PER_CAPit = β0 + β5AFRICAi + β6CEEURi + β7LATAMi + β8SEASIAi +
β1POP_GRWOTHit + β2ENG_USEit + β3TV_PER_1Kit +
β4POLITY2it
LS // Dependent Variable is GDP_PER_CAP
Date: 05/04/05 Time: 13:24
Sample: 1 450
Included observations: 396
Excluded observations: 54
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Statistic

C
AFRICA
CEEUR
LATAM
SEASIA
POP_GROWTH
ENG_USE
TV_PER_1K
POLITY2

108.4387
-366.259
-2364.304
84.72033
-514.5997
374.3721
3.054197
8.810441
135.8405

429.8966
294.6774
351.6637
330.0281
309.1028
96.69357
0.14807
1.297655
17.60915

0.252244
-1.242915
-6.723196
0.256706
-1.664817
3.871737
20.62667
6.78951
7.714199

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

0.800277
0.796149
1653.251
1.06E+09
-3491.905
0.15001

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwartz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Prob.
0.801
0.2147
0
0.7975
0.0968
0.0001
0
0
0
5835.141
3661.693
14.84346
14.93395
193.8358
0

F Test4 Comparing Regressions 1 and 2:
F value = [(1.27x109-1.06x109)/4] / [1.06x109/(396-8-1)] = 19.2
F critical = 3.32
F value > F critical (Region intercepts significantly reduced SSR)
25000
20000
15000
10000
6000

5000

4000

0

2000

-5000

0
-2000
-4000
-6000
50

100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Residual

Actual

Fitted

4
All F tests in this appendix have the null hypothesis that the added coefficients in the second
(unconstrained) regression are not statistically different from zero. This null hypothesis is rejected with
an F value greater than the critical value.
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Regression 3:
GDP_PER_CAPit = β0 + β5AFRICAi + β6CEEURi + β7LATAMi + β8SEASIAi +
β1POP_GRWOTHit + β2ENG_USEit + β3TV_PER_1Kit +
β4POLITY2it + β9POLITY2AFRICAit + β10POLITY2CEEURit +
β11POLITY2LATAMit + β12POLITY2SEASIAit
LS // Dependent Variable is GDP_PER_CAP
Date: 05/04/05 Time: 13:25
Sample: 1 450
Included observations: 396
Excluded observations: 54
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Statistic

C
AFRICA
CEEUR
LATAM
SEASIA
POP_GROWTH
ENG_USE
TV_PER_1K
POLITY2
POLITY2AFRICA
POLITY2CEEUR
POLITY2LATAM
POLITY2SEASIA

1240.869
-1222.048
-2505.904
261.3203
-1017.338
339.9304
2.775928
8.351052
395.68
-359.7217
-336.342
-378.4859
-342.2033

384.3982
267.239
312.4209
477.4627
280.0549
83.11448
0.150314
1.1812
26.81959
38.54642
39.109
60.41975
39.28691

3.228081
-4.572867
-8.020924
0.54731
-3.632636
4.089906
18.46748
7.069976
14.7534
-9.332169
-8.600118
-6.264275
-8.710363

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

0.854675
0.850122
1417.593
7.70E+08
-3428.95
0.157658

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwartz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Prob.
0.0014
0
0
0.5845
0.0003
0.0001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5835.141
3661.693
14.54571
14.67641
187.7058
0

F Test Comparing Regressions 2 and 3:
F value = [(1.06x109-7.70x108)/4] / [7.70x108/(396-12-1)] = 36.1
F critical = 3.32
F value > F critical (Interacting Polity2 with the region dummies significantly
reduced SSR)
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
4000

0

2000
0
-2000
-4000
-6000
50

100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Residual

Actual

Fitted
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Regression 4:
GDP_PER_CAP = β0 + β5AFRICAi + β6CEEURi + β7LATAMi + β8SEASIAi +
β1POP_GRWOTHit + β2ENG_USEit + β3TV_PER_1Kit +
β4POLITY2it + β9POLITY2AFRICAit + β10POLITYCEEURit +
β11POLITY2LATAMit + β12POLITY2SEASIAit + β13POLITY22it
+ β14POLITY22AFRICAit + β15POLITY22CEEURit +
β16POLITY22LATAMit + β17POLITY22SEASIAit
LS // Dependent Variable is GDP_PER_CAP
Date: 05/04/05 Time: 13:27
Sample: 1 450
Included observations: 396
Excluded observations: 54
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Statistic

C
AFRICA
CEEUR
LATAM
SEASIA
POP_GROWTH
ENG_USE
TV_PER_1K
POLITY2
POLITY2AFRICA
POLITY2CEEUR
POLITY2LATAM
POLITY2SEASIA
SQPOLITY2
SQPOLITY2AFRICA
SQPOLITY2CEEUR
SQPOLITY2LATAM
SQPOLITY2SEASIA

1064.174
-1037.952
-2412.131
577.7543
-872.0018
358.2648
2.811611
8.259081
287.1965
-30.57875
-101.4521
412.5941
-361.5445
12.58083
-40.77043
-27.41469
-100.7014
4.119261

433.1838
287.7742
326.0768
491.7291
309.4925
85.41218
0.165779
1.243341
129.139
185.4774
197.6356
233.963
186.333
14.78552
22.21569
22.27362
28.48635
22.92887

2.456633
-3.606826
-7.39743
1.174944
-2.817521
4.194539
16.96001
6.642651
2.223933
-0.164865
-0.513329
1.763501
-1.940314
0.850888
-1.835209
-1.230815
-3.535075
0.179654

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

0.861649
0.855427
1392.276
7.33E+08
-3419.212
0.179326

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwartz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Prob.
0.0145
0.0004
0
0.2408
0.0051
0
0
0
0.0267
0.8691
0.608
0.0786
0.0531
0.3954
0.0673
0.2192
0.0005
0.8575
5835.141
3661.693
14.52178
14.70275
138.4816
0

F Test Comparing Regressions 3 and 4:
F value = [(7.70x108-7.33x108)/5] / [7.33x108/(396-17-1)] = 3.82
F critical = 3.32
F value > F critical (Adding the signed square of Polity2 and interacting it with
the region dummies significantly reduced SSR)

Residual graph shown on next page.
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Regression 5:
GDP_PER_CAPit= α1 + α2POP_GROWTHit + α3ENG_USEit +
α4TV_PER_1Kit + α5POLITY2it
POLITY2 = α6 + α7GDP_PER_CAPit + α8FREEDOMit

(Instrumental variables: POP_GROWTHit, ENG_USEit, TV_PER_1Kit, FREEDOMit)
Ordinary least squares method: Output and residuals graph:
System: SYSTEM
Estimation Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1 450
Date: 05/04/05 Time: 13:29
Coefficient
C(1)
C(2)
C(3)
C(4)
C(5)
C(6)
C(7)
C(8)
Determinant residual covariance

-1027.087
778.2946
2.928322
8.275814
153.855
-9.335891
0.000122
1.602985

Std. Error
305.1321
85.91299
0.140301
1.200964
16.47887
0.341062
4.81E-05
0.052186

T-Statistic
-3.366039
9.059102
20.87169
6.890975
9.3365
-27.37299
2.547417
30.71687

Prob.
0.0008
0
0
0
0
0
0.011
0

31631232

Equation: GDP_PER_CAP = C(1) + C(2)*POP_GROWTH + C(3)*ENG_USE
+ C(4)*TV_PER_1K + C(5)*POLITY2
Observations: 396
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------R-squared
0.761133
Mean dependent var
5835.141
Adjusted R-squared
0.758689
S.D. dependent var
3661.693
S.E. of regression
1798.748
Sum squared resid
1.27E+09
Durbin-Watson stat
0.176476
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Equation: POLITY2 = C(6) + C(7)*GDP_PER_CAP + C(8)*FREEDOM
Observations: 444
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------R-squared
0.767649
Mean dependent var
2.094595
Adjusted R-squared
0.766596
S.D. dependent var
6.70097
S.E. of regression
3.237368
Sum squared resid
4621.923
Durbin-Watson stat
0.396066

GDP_PER_CAP Residuals
6000
4000
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0
-2000
-4000
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-8000
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POLITY2 Residuals
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-15
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Two-stage least squares method: Output and residuals graph:
System: SYSTEM
Estimation Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Instruments: POP_GROWTH ENG_USE TV_PER_1K FREEDOM C
Sample: 1 450
Date: 05/04/05 Time: 13:30
Coefficient
C(1)
C(2)
C(3)
C(4)
C(5)
C(6)
C(7)
C(8)

-943.5646
803.3967
2.947993
6.688642
205.9035
-9.122731
8.20E-05
1.610054

Determinant residual covariance

Std. Error

T-Statistic

309.6544
87.21193
0.142159
1.27486
20.87231
0.399791
6.74E-05
0.063124

Prob.

-3.047154
9.212004
20.73734
5.246572
9.864912
-22.81875
1.217015
25.50601

0.0024
0
0
0
0
0
0.224
0

33864897

Equation: GDP_PER_CAP = C(1) + C(2)*POP_GROWTH + C(3)*ENG_USE
+ C(4)*TV_PER_1K + C(5)*POLITY2
Observations: 396
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------R-squared
0.755038
Mean dependent var
5835.141
Adjusted R-squared
0.752532
S.D. dependent var
3661.693
S.E. of regression
1821.55
Sum squared resid
1.30E+09
Durbin-Watson stat
0.186121
Equation: POLITY2 = C(6) + C(7)*GDP_PER_CAP + C(8)*FREEDOM
Observations: 396
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------R-squared
0.740193
Mean dependent var
2.353535
Adjusted R-squared
0.738871
S.D. dependent var
6.61347
S.E. of regression
3.379533
Sum squared resid
4488.549
Durbin-Watson stat
0.332325

POLITY2 Residuals
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The Hausman Test on Regression 5
(Special thanks to Professor Gary Krueger for personally conducting the Hausman
test on my results)
Null hypothesis: GDP per capita and Polity2 are not jointly correlated
Alternative hypothesis: GDP per capita and Polity2 are jointly correlated
Critical value: 1.97
Measured values:
Confidence Level Value
Conclusion
99%
6.63 Do not reject null hypothesis
97.5%
5.02 Do not reject null hypothesis
95%
3.84 Do not reject null hypothesis
90%
2.71 Do not reject null hypothesis
75%
1.32
Reject null hypothesis

The Polity2 Score
Following is part of the description of the Polity2 score, as well as the Polity,
Democ, and Autoc scores on which Polity2 is based. These descriptions are all
from the Dataset Users’ Manual of the Polity IV Project, prepared by Monty G.
Marshall of the University of Maryland, College Park and Keith Jaggers of Colorado
State University in 2002. For a full description of all Polity IV variables, visit
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.
POLITY2
Revised Combined Polity Score: This variable is a modified version of the POLITY
variable added in order to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime measure in timeseries analyses. It modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple
treatment, or “fix”, to convert instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, 77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10).
POLITY
Combined Polity Score: The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC
score from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).
DEMOC
Institutionalized Democracy: Democracy is conceived as three essential,
interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through
which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders.
Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the
executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives
and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the
rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are
means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include
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coded data on civil liberties. The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point
scale (0-10).
AUTOC
Institutionalized Autocracy: "Authoritarian regime" in Western political discourse is a
pejorative term for some very diverse kinds of political systems whose common
properties are a lack of regularized political competition and concern for political
freedoms. We use the more neutral term Autocracy and define it operationally in
terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form,
autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief
executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite,
and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Most
modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and
economic activity, but we regard this as a function of political ideology and choice,
not a defining property of autocracy. Social democracies also exercise relatively high
degrees of directiveness. We prefer to leave open for empirical investigation the
question of how Autocracy, Democracy, and Directiveness (performance) have
covaried over time. An eleven-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively.

The Data Set
The next thirteen pages include the complete data set used in this research.
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